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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The District Court Erred In Reversing Wilks' Conviction For Maintaining Junk
Motor Vehicles On Residential Property

A.

Introduction
The district court reversed Wilks' conviction for violating the Fruitland City

junk motor vehicle ordinance, concluding that Wilks' use of his parents' property
"for the storage, salvage and sale" of junk vehicles "is a constitutionally protected
pre-existing non-conforming use and as such is protected under Idaho law." (R,
pp.58-64.) The district court erred for four alternative reasons. First, Wilks does
not own the real property in question and, as such, has no standing to assert a
due process violation resulting from enforcement of the ordinance. (Appellant's
brief, pp.8-10.) Second, Wilks failed in the trial court to demonstrate that his
incidental use of the residential property to store and occasionally sell junk motor
vehicles constituted a valid preexisting nonconforming use.

(Appellant's brief,

pp.10-13.) Third, even assuming the storage and occasional sale of junk motor
vehicles was a valid preexisting nonconforming use, the evidence at trial showed
that Wilks unlawfully expanded and enlarged that prior use in violation of the junk
motor vehicle ordinance. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-18.) Finally, even assuming
Wilks'

use of the property is merely a continuation of a preexisting

nonconforming use, enforcement of the ordinance against him does not violate
due process but is, instead a lawful exercise of the city's police power.
(Appellant's brief, pp.18-23.)
Wilks' arguments in response are, for the most part, unremarkable. As far
as the state can discern, Wilks has not challenged the state's standing
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argument, nor has he provided any response to the state's third and fourth
arguments - i.e., that Wilks unlawfully expanded any preexisting nonconforming
use, and Wilks' right to continue any preexisting nonconforming use is
subservient to the city's lawful exercise of police power to abate nuisances. (See
generally Respondent's brief, pp.3-7.)

Instead, Wilks maintains in wholly

conclusory fashion that his use of the property to store junk motor vehicles is a
preexisting nonconforming use that he has a "constitutional right" to continue.
(Respondent's brief, p.3 (capitalization altered, underlining omitted).) The state
rests on its opening brief with respect to this issue and maintains, based on the
argument and authority cited therein, that Wilks has failed to demonstrate any
valid preexisting nonconforming use and, alternatively, has failed to establish
that he did not unlawfully expand or enlarge that use in violation of the city
ordinance. (See Appellant's brief, pp.10-18.)
Wilks does advance two alternative arguments that, he claims, support
the district court's opinion reversing his conviction. First, he argues, as he did at
trial and on appeal to the district court (Tr., p.112, Ls.2-19; R., p.86), that the
state failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because it
failed to present evidence of compliance with the notice provision of the Fruitland
City junk motor vehicle ordinance (Appellant's brief, pp.4-6). This argument fails
because notice is not an element of the offense Wilks was charged with - i.e.
maintaining junk motor vehicles on residential property for more than 30 days, in
violation of Fruitland City Code § 8-2B-2. Wilks also argues that the Fruitland
City junk motor vehicle ordinance is "defective on its face" because it does not
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explicitly permit an exemption for preexisting nonconforming uses. (Appellant's
brief, pp.6-7 (capitalization altered, underlining omitted).)

This argument is

waived because it is not accompanied by any citation to legal authority.

B.

Prior Notice Of The Violation Is Not An Element Of Maintaining Junk
Motor Vehicles Under Fruitland City Code§ 8-28-2
The state charged Wilks with maintaining junk motor vehicles on

residential property, in violation of Fruitland City Code § 8-28-2, which provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to maintain a junk motor vehicle, vehicles, or
parts thereof on residential property or business property for a period of more
than thirty (30) days."

Because the undisputed evidence at trial showed that

Wilks had maintained junk vehicles on his parents' residential property for
several years in a manner not otherwise exempted by Fruitland City Code § 828-31 (see Appellant's brief, pp.2-3, 16-17 (summary of trial evidence)), the
magistrate found Wilks guilty of violating the junk motor vehicle ordinance (Tr.,
p. 118, Ls.1-17).
On appeal, Wilks does not dispute that the evidence presented at trial
showed he maintained junk motor vehicles on the residential property for more
than 30 days in a manner not otherwise exempted by the provisions of the
ordinance. He nevertheless contends there was insufficient evidence to support
his conviction because the state failed to prove it complied with the notice
provisions of Fruitland City Code § 8-28-4. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-6.). Wilks'

1

Section 8-28-3 sets forth four exceptions to the prohibition against maintaining
junk motor vehicles on residential property, none of which are applicable in this
case.
3

argument is without merit. A plain reading of the ordinance shows the notice
provisions of Section 8-2B-4 apply only when the city seeks to remove junk
motor vehicles from the property pursuant to the removal procedures set forth in
Section 8-2B-4; they are not a prerequisite to the charging of a nuisance for
maintaining junk vehicles on residential property in violation of Section 8-2B2(B).2

The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative
intent. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v.
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because "the
best guide to legislative intent" is the words of the statute, the interpreration of a
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho
326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009).

Where the statutory language is

unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law as written.
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores. Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759
(2006).

Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only one

reasonable interpretation, it is the Court's duty to give the statute that
interpretation. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,
895-96, 265 P.3d 502, 508-09 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that
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Wilks asserts he was "charged" under Sections "8-2B-1, 2, 3 & 4."
(Respondent's brief, p.3.)
Wilks is incorrect.
Neither the citation nor
subsequently filed complaint mention Section 8-2B-4, and the complaint
specifically alleges the offense of "allow[ing] a junk vehicle to remain" on the
property, not the refusal to remove the junk vehicles after being instructed to do
so. (See R., pp.5, 8-9.)
4

Court might not give effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was
"palpably absurd").
Fruitland City Code § 8-2B-4, relied upon by Wilks, sets forth the
procedures with which the City of Fruitland must comply before removing junk
motor vehicles from any real property within the city limits.

Specifically, that

section provides in relevant part:
A.
Removal By City: The police chief, fire chief or building
inspector or their authorized representatives may order any junk
motor vehicle, vehicles or parts thereof removed within ten (10)
days.

1. Notice of such order shall be placed upon said junk motor
vehicle, vehicles, or parts thereof. Copies of said notices shall
be served upon any adult occupying the real estate on which
the junk motor vehicle, vehicles or parts thereof are located
and upon the owner of the junk, if known. If no occupant of the
real estate or owner of the junk vehicle, vehicles or parts
thereof can be found, a notice affixed to any building on the
real estate shall constitute notice to the owner or occupant of
the real estate and to the owners of the junk motor vehicle,
vehicles or parts thereof. If there is no building on the real
estate, said notice may be affixed elsewhere on the real estate.

2. If said junk vehicle, vehicles or parts thereof are not
removed within the time so fixed, the police chief, fire chief or
building inspector or their authorized representatives may
cause said junk vehicle, vehicles or parts thereof to be
removed and the actual cost of removal or tow-in charge and a
storage charge for so long as the same is in possession or
custody of the city shall be charged to the owner. In the event
said junk motor vehicle, vehicles or parts thereof are not
claimed by the lawful owner, then and in that event the same
shall be sold ....
B. Refusal To Remove: It shall be unlawful and a misdemeanor
for any person to fail or refuse to remove a wrecked, junk motor
vehicle, vehicles or parts thereof or refuse to abate such nuisance
when ordered to do so in accordance with the provisions of this
article.
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By its plain language, the notice requirement of Section 8-2B-4 applies
when city officials "order any junk motor vehicle, vehicles or parts thereof
removed" from real property.

Fruitland City Code § 8-2B-4(A)(1 ).

The plain

language of the ordinance also makes clear that compliance with the notice
requirement of Section 8-2B-4(A)(1) is an element of a prosecution for refusing
to remove a junk motor vehicle in violation of Section 8-2B-4(8). Wilks, however,
was not charged with refusing to remove his junk vehicles in violation of Section
8-2B-4(8).

Rather, he was charged with maintaining junk motor vehicles in

violation of Section 8-2B-2. (R., pp.5, 8-9.) Nowhere in either Section 8-2B-2 or
Section 8-2B-4 is there any requirement that the state provide notice before
charging a violation of Section 8-2B-2(8). The notice requirement of Section 82B-4 is therefore inapplicable to Wilks' prosecution for maintaining junk motor
vehicles in violation of Section 8-2B-2(8) and, as such, was not an element the
state was required to prove in this case. Wilks has failed to show any basis for
reversal of his conviction.

C.

Wilks Has Waived Consideration Of His Claim That The Ordinance At
Issue Is "Defective On Its Face"
It is well established in Idaho law that an appellate court will not consider

a claim of error that is not supported by both argument and citation to authority.
State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 518, 164 P.3d 790, 798 (2007); State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739, 742 (2007); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,
263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not supported by
propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered."). Wilks
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argues that the Fruitland City junk motor vehicle ordinance is "defective on its
face" because it does not explicitly exempt from prosecution constitutionally
protected

preexisting

nonconforming

uses.

(capitalization altered, underlining omitted).)

(Appellant's

brief,

pp.6-7

Wilks, however, has failed to

support his argument with citation to any legal authority whatsoever. Because he
has failed to do so, the issue is waived and should not be considered by this
Court.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's
appellate decision and reinstate Wilks' conviction.
DATED this 16th day of January 2013.

L I A. FLEMING
~
Deputy Attorney Ge:a
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